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INCOME TAXATION
Denial of Tax Exempt Status for Racially
Discriminatory Schools
Bob Jones University v. U.S.,
103 S.Ct. 2017 (1983)
I. INTRODUCTION
S INCE THE ADOPTION of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments
to the United States Constitution,I the elimination of racial discrimina-
tion has been constitutionally mandated.2 The focus of eliminating racial
discrimination in education began with Brown v. Board of Education,3 and
has resulted in the passage of numerous federal laws4 and the promulgation
of executive orders by various Presidents.' These laws and orders illustrate that
the federal government is committed to eliminating racial discrimination in all
areas, not only in education.
The extent to which the government may deny tax-exempt status in order
to further its goal of eliminating racial discrimination is a question of para-
mount importance. The United States Supreme Court recently addressed this
question in the case of Bob Jones University v. U.S., 6 a consolidated action
which involved a conflict between two established public policies: racial equality
and religious freedom. The Court held that this nation's policy of racial equality
overrides any interest that an educational and religious institution may have
in promoting racial discrimination.'
'The thirteenth amendment outlawed slavery. The fourteenth amendment was designed to afford due process
and equal protection of the laws. The fifteenth amendment guaranteed black men the right to vote. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII-XV.
'Although these amendments were adopted over a century ago, their enforcement has been inconsistent.
For a discussion of the amendments and their history, see United States Comm'n on Civil Rights, Civil
Rights: A National, Not a Special Interest (June 1981).
3347 U.S. 483 (1954).
'See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified, as amended, at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a-2000f (1976 & Supp. III 1979); Emergency School Aid Act, Pub. L. No. 95-561, Tit. VI, 92
Stat. 2252 (1978) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3191-3207 (Supp. III 1979) ).
'See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 Compilation); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3
C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation); Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-1970 Compilation);
Exec. Order No. 12,067, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,967 (July 5, 1978).
0103 S.Ct. 2017 (1983).
'Id. at 2035.
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II. HISTORY
Until 1970, private schools enjoyed tax-exempt status regardless of their
racial admissions policies, under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code("the Code").' In addition, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") granted tax-
able deductions for contributions to such schools under section 170 of the Code.9
This tax-exempt status changed in July of 1970, when the IRS ruled'" that
private schools which practice racial discrimination could no longer enjoy tax-
exempt status under section 501 (c)(3). " The IRS also concluded that gifts to
such schools could not be treated as charitable deductions for income tax pur-
poses under section 170.'2 Private schools were formally notified of this change
in policy by the IRS in a letter dated November 30, 1970.'1
On June 30, 1971, the IRS' amended construction of the Tax Code was
approved in Green v. Connally. " Green involved a class action instituted by
parents of black children attending public schools in Mississippi, to enjoin U.S.
Treasury officials from allowing tax-exempt status and contributions deduc-
tions to private schools which discriminate. In upholding the IRS, the Federal
District Court for the District of Columbia stated that the Code "can no longer
be construed so as to provide to private schools operating on a racially
discriminatory premise the support of the exemptions and deductions which
Federal tax law affords to charitable organizations and their sponsors." 5
Prior to 1970, Bob Jones University' ("Bob Jones" or "University") en-
'I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976). Section 501(c)(3) exempts the following organizations from taxation:
"Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster
national or international amateur sports competition ... ." Id.
'I.R.C. § 170 (1976). Section 170(a) allows deductions for "charitable contributions." Section 170(c) provides
in pertinent part:(c) Charitable contribution defined. For purposes of this section, the term "charitable contribution"
means a contribution or gift to or for the use of -...(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest fund, or foundation -.(B) organized and operated exclusive for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition, .. . or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals ....
"This ruling followed Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970), appeal dismissed sub nom.Cannon v. Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970). In Green, the District Court for the District of Columbia issued
a preliminary injunction prohibiting the IRS from approving tax-exempt status (under §§ 501(c)(3) and170) to "private schools operated on a racially segregated basis as an alternative to white students seeking
to avoid desegregated public schools." 309 F. Supp. at 1140.
"Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
121d.
I Id.
1'330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'dsub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (per curiam). After
the Green decision, the IRS formalized the policy in several rulings of which the most relevant are Rev.Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230; Rev. Proc. 72-54, 1972-2 C.B. 834. The 1972 procedures were superceded
in 1975 by Rev. Proc. 75-50, 1975-2 C.B. 587.
1"330 F. Supp. at 1164.
"The University is a religious and educational institution which enrolls about five thousand students from
kindergarten through college and graduate school. Bob Jones, 103 S.Ct. at 2022.
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joyed tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3).' 7 Following the Green v.
Kennedy decision in 1970,1s however, the IRS notified the University that it
intended to eliminate the tax-exempt status of private schools which practiced
racial discrimination in their admissions procedures. 9
Although the University has permitted unmarried blacks to enroll since
May 29, 1975,20 a disciplinary rule prohibits interracial dating and marriage.2'
This rule constitutes an integral part of the admissions policy in that applicants
engaged in an interracial marriage or known to advocate interracial marriage
or dating are denied admissions.22
Upon the revocation of its tax exempt status,23 the University instituted
this action in the United States Disctrict Court for the District of South
Carolina."' The district court held in favor of Bob Jones but the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed," stating that "certain governmental
interests are so compelling that conflicting religious practices must yield in their
favor.''26 The court remanded the case to the district court with instructions
to dismiss the University's claim and to reinstate the government's counterclaim.
A similar situation involved Goldsboro Christian Schools" ("Goldsboro"
"Bob Jones, 103 S.Ct. at 2023.
"See supra note 10.
"Id. The University's tax-exempt status was officially revoked by the IRS on January 19, 1976, and was
made effective as of December 1, 1970, the day after the University was formally notified of the change
in IRS policy.
2 Until 1971 blacks were completely excluded in order to further the University's belief that the Scriptures
forbid interracial marriage and dating. Beginning in 1971 Bob Jones accepted applications from blacks
married within their race but did not accept applications from unmarried blacks. Bob Jones, 103 S.Ct.
at 2022-2023.
"Id. at 2023. The rule states:
There is to be no interracial dating.
1. Students who are partners in an interracial marriage will be expelled.
2. Students who are members of or affiliated with any group or organization which holds one of its
goals or advocates interracial marriage will be expelled.
3. Students who date outside their own race will be expelled.
4. Students who espouse, promote, or encourage others to violate the University's dating rules and
regulations will be expelled.
Id.
22Id.
"In 1975, the University filed returns under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act for the period from
December 1, 1970, to December 31, 1975. It subsequently paid a tax in the amount of $21.00 on one employee
for 1975. When the IRS denied the University's request for a refund of the $21.00, Bob Jones instituted
this action. The Government counterclaimed for unpaid federal unemployment taxes for the taxable years
1971 through 1975, totalling $489,675.59, plus interest. Id.
"An organization facing loss of tax-exempt status may pay the tax and sue for a refund in federal district
court or the Court of Claims following expiration of the statutory six-month waiting period. I.R.C. §
7422 (1976); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(1) and 1491 (1976).
"Bob Jones, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1981).
"Id. at 154.
"Goldsboro offers classes from kindergarten through high school and has satisfied the State of North
Carolina's requirements for secular education in private schools. Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc. v.
U.S., 436 F.Supp. 1314, 1316 (E.D.N.C. 1977).
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or "School"). Goldsboro maintains a racially discriminatory admissions policy
based upon its interpretation of the Bible.28 This interpretation requires the
exclusion of blacks.29 Unlike Bob Jones University, Goldsboro never had tax-
exempt status under section 501(c)(3)." When the IRS audited the school for
the years 1969-1972, it determined that Goldsboro was not an organization
described in section 501(c)(3) 3" and thus was required to pay taxes under the
Federal Unemployment Tax Act32 and the Federal Insurance Contribution Act. 3
After paying the taxes with respect to one employee, Goldsboro filed a
suit seeking a refund.3" The school contended that it had been improperly denied
tax-exempt status under section 501 (c)(3)." The IRS filed a counterclaim for
unpaid social security and unemployment taxes for the years 1969 through 1972,
including interest and penalities.1
6
On cross motions for summary judgment, the District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina held that although Goldsboro's admissions policy
was based on a sincere religious belief, it precluded the school from qualifying
as a corporation under section 501(c)(3). 7 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Goldsboro
and Bob Jones on October 13, 1981.38
This note seeks to establish that the provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code that exempt organizations from taxation are not applicable to religious
schools such as Bob Jones and Goldsboro which discriminate on the basis of
2 Goldsboro believes that race is determined by descent from one of Noah's three sons - Ham, Shem,
and Japheth. Orientals and blacks are Hamitic, Hebrews are Shemitic, and Caucasions are Japhethitic.
Mixing of the races is regarded as a violation of God's command. Bob Jones, 103 S.Ct. at 2024 n.6.
"Although Goldsboro's interpretation of the Bible indicates the exclusion of all noncaucasians, the school
has accepted noncaucasians but has never accepted blacks. Nevertheless, the district court assumed that
the school's racially discriminatory admissions policy is based upon a valid religious belief. Goldsboro,
436 F.Supp. at 1317.
"Bob Jones, 103 S.Ct. at 2024.
31Id.
3"26 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3125 (1976).
"26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1976).
3"d.
"Goldsboro also claimed that it was not required to pay taxes on lodging furnished to its teachers. This
issue, however, was not brought before the U.S. Supreme Court. Bob Jones, 103 S.Ct. at 2024 n.7.
"The IRS originally counterclaimed for $160,073.96, but because it did not begin enforcing its policy of
denying tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools until November 30, 1970, the IRS,
by stipulation, agreed to abate its assessment for 1969 and most of 1970. The counterclaim was accordingly
reduced to $116,190.99. Bob Jones, 103 S.Ct. at 2024 n.8.
3"Goldsboro, 436 F.Supp. at 1320 (E.D.N.C. 1977).
"After the Court granted certiorari, the Department of Justice submitted a memorandum to the Court
on January 8, 1982, asking the Court to vacate the judgments in Bob Jones and Goldsboro. Since the
Treasury Department had begun the process for revoking Revenue Ruling 71-447 and other rulings and
regulations, the Government asserted that the two cases should be vacated as moot. Before the Court
ruled on this motion, the Government was enjoined from granting or restoring tax-exempt status to racially
discriminatory private schools in Wright v. Regan, No. 80-1124 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 1982) (temporary
order). After Wright, the government withdrew its request that the actions be dismissed as moot. Bob
Jones, 103 S.Ct. at 2025 n.9.
[Vol. 17:1AKRON LAW REVIEW
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race. In addition, the IRS' interpretation of the Code and its resulting actions
did not constitute "legislating," nor did it violate the right of religious schools
to freely exercise their religious tenets.
III. PUBLIC BENEFIT THEORY
Historically, charities have occupied a protected position in our community.
As early as 1861 the United States Supreme Court announced that the "courts
of chancery will sustain and protect ... a gift ... to public charitable uses,
provided the same is consistent with local laws and public policy. . . . - 9 Since
1894, the federal income tax laws40 have provided an exemption for certain
charitable organizations' because they serve desirable public purposes.
Bob Jones and Goldsboro argued that sections 501(c)(3) and 170 of the
Code make any "charitable, religious or educational" organization tax-exempt
regardless of its racial policies.4 2 Although the Code does not explicitly men-
tion racial discrimination, the Supreme Court analyzed sections 170 and 501(c)(3)
and concluded that inherent in the Code is the intent that tax exemption depends
on meeting "common law standards of charity."41 3 This means that before an
institution can attain tax-exempt status it must serve a public purpose and not
be contrary to public policy.44 Thus, religious and educational entities which
violate public policy are not charitable and as such cannot be tax-exempt.
Since Brown v. Board of Education,4 5 it has become clear that racial
discrimination in education is contrary to established public policy.46 The Brown
holding is not limited to public education. In Norwood v. Harrison,7 the
Supreme Court held that free textbooks are a form of tangible financial
assistance benefitting public and private schools and as such cannot be pro-
vided to any school that practices racial discrimination.48 The Court also remark-
"Bob Jones, 103 S.Ct. at 2027, (quoting Perin v. Carey, 24 How. 465, 501 (1861)).
"°Act of August 27, 1984, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509, 556-557 (1894). For a list of these federal income
tax laws which exempt certain charitable organizations see United States Comm'n on Civil Rights,
Discriminatory Religious Schools and Tax Exempt Status, p.4, n.8 (December 1982).
"A common law definition of charity is found in Ould v. Washington Hospital for Foundlings, 95 U.S.
303 (1877): "A charitable use, where neither law nor public policy forbids, may be applied to almost any
thing that tends to promote the well-doing and well-being of social man." Id. at 311. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 374 comment f at 258 (1959); and Simon, The Tax-Exempt Status
of Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 36 TAX L. REV. 477, 483-500 (1981).
"Bob Jones, 103 S.Ct. at 2025.
"Id. at 2026.
"Id.
"347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"Despite the 1954 announcement in Brown, segregation in public schools continued and an alternative
system of private, segregated schools was established. For a discussion concerning the tactics utilized by
the South to impede the desegregation process see generally, Note, Segregation Academies and State Action,
82 YALE L.J. 1436 (1973), and Comment, The Private, Racially Segregated, Sectarian School, 29 MERCER
L. REv. 1099 (1978).
"413 U.S. 455 (1973).
"ld. at 469.
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ed that "discriminatory treatment exerts a pervasive influence on the entire
educational process."" 9
Racial discrimination in private education was also addressed in Runyon
v. McCrary. 10 Runyon involved a civil rights action by parents of black children
who were denied admission to private schools solely on the basis of race. In
construing 42 U.S.C. § 1981,"' the Supreme Court held that racial discrimina-
tion in admissions to private, nonsectarian schools is unlawful."
In light of these decisions it is evident that the racially discriminatory
admissions policy of Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools
neither furthers an established public policy nor confers a public benefit. This
is so even though the schools' policies are based upon a sincere religious belief."
IV. AUTHORITY OF IRS
Even if the IRS was correct in concluding that racial discrimination in
private schools violates public policy, Goldsboro and Bob Jones argued that
the IRS did not have the authority to issue its 1970 and 1971 rulings.54 Both
institutions alleged that the IRS "legislated" for Congress because the rulings
altered the scope of the Code.55
Although not specifically mandated, the power of the IRS to construe the
Internal Revenue Code has been sanctioned by the Supreme Court in a long
line of precedents.56 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, noted that
these precedents illustrate that the IRS has the duty to determine whether a
particular organization is "charitable" for the purpose of sections 170 and
501(c)(3). 7 Burger concluded that coupled with this duty is the authority of
the IRS to determine whether an organization's activities are so contrary to
public policy that it is unable to provide a public benefit worthy of tax-exempt
status.
Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not concur in the majority's conclu-
sion concerning the authority of the IRS. Although Justice Powell concurred
with the Court's judgment, he was bothered by the "broader implications of
"Id. (citation omitted).
50427 U.S. 160 (1976).
"-42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) provides: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and to enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws ... as is enjoyed by white citizens . Id.
"427 U.S. 160 (1976).
103 S.Ct. at 2030. In order to determine whether given activities provide a public benefit, contemporary
standards must be used. See Walz v. Tax Commissioner of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
"For a brief discussion concerning these rulings see supra text accompanying notes 8-24.
"Bob Jones, 103 S.Ct. at 2031.
16Id. (citing Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156, 169 (1981); U.S. v. Correll, 389 U.S.
299, 306-307 (1967); Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 469-470 (1900)).
I1d.
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the Court's opinion .... "1 Justice Rehnquist dissented because the "Court
should not legislate for Congress." 9
Both sides used the inaction of Congress to support their viewpoint. Chief
Justice Burger stated that Congress' failure to modify the IRS rulings of 1970
and 1971 demonstrates "legislative acquiescence in and ratification by
implication .... ."I0 Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, believed that Congress'
inaction does not mean that it has approved theh rulings. 61 According to Justice
Rehnquist, the IRS, in so construing the Code, overstepped its boundary and
disregarded its limits of authority as established by Congress.
Although Justice Rehnquist's concerns are valid, his reasoning is shallow.
As a practical matter, the IRS must be permitted to interpret the Code, with
which it works every day and whose day to day operation Congress is inherently
unable to oversee. 6 Although Congress created the Code, only the IRS can
effectively implement it.
Justice Rehnquist also argued that section 501(c)(3) does not contain a
requirement that an entity first provide a public benefit before it can be given
tax-exempt status. 63 Because of this, he concluded that an organization, so long
as it fits within section 501(c)(3), can be given tax-exempt status regardless of
its admissions policy.
Judge Hall, author of the Fourth Circuit decision in Bob Jones, would
characterize Justice Rehnquist's analysis as "simplistic" because it tears sec-
tion 501(c)(3) "from its roots."'6 The landmark case of Green v. Connally"
is especially useful in this area. Judge Hall utilized the Green decision to state
that section 501(c)(3) should not be separated from "its background in the law
of charitable trusts." ' 66
Finally, one cannot ignore the congressional intent and legislative history
concerning sections 170 and 501(c)(3). The Bob Jones Court pointed to con-
gressional committee reports which insist that "discrimination on account of
race is inconsistent with an educational institution's tax-exempt status. ' 67
"Id. at 2036 (Powell, J., concurring).
"Id. at 2045 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
60Id. at 2033.
6"Id. at 2044 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Congressman Ashbrook, who introduced an amendment limiting
enforcement procedures for determining whether a school operated in a racially nondiscriminatory manner,
stated that, "[t]he IRS has no authority to create public policy." In the same debate, Congressman Grassley
declared that racial discrimination should not receive preferred tax status. Bob Jones, 103 S.Ct. at 2044
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting), (quoting 125 Cong. Rec. H5879-80 (daily ed. July 13, 1979)).
6"Bob Jones, 103 S.Ct. at 2031.
"Id. Section 501(c)(3) is found, in part, supra at note 8.
'Bob Jones, 639 F.2d at 151.
"For a brief discussion of the Green decision, see supra text accompanying notes 14-16.
"Bob Jones, 639 F.2d at 151.
"Bob Jones, 103 S.Ct. at 2034, (quoting S. REP. No. 1318, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 7-8 and n.5 (1976);
H.R. REaP. No. 1353, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 8 and n.5 (1976)).
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V. FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS
The first amendment to the United States Constitution states that "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof." 68 Bob Jones and Goldsboro argued that the IRS'
interpretation of sections 170 and 501(c)(3) violated their rights under the first
amendment. The schools asserted that the denial of tax benefits penalized their
right to freely practice their religious beliefs.
The Constitution permits parents to enroll their children in private educa-
tional institutions.69 It also allows governmental assistance to private schools
where public schools also receive assistance. 70 Nevertheless, the Constitution
does not allow, nor should it tolerate, state aid to private schools which prac-
tice racial discrimination. 7'
Denial of tax benefits is a strong measure and will have a significant im-
pact upon private religious schools .72 This does not mean that these schools
will be unable to practice their credences. 73 It simply means that they will be
unable to have tax-exempt status so long as they adhere to religious tenets which
promote racial discrimination.
The Bob Jones Court employed a balancing test and found that since the
governmental interest in preventing racial discrimination is "compelling," it
"substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on peti-
tioners' exercise of their religious beliefs." 4 The strong national interest in pro-
moting racial equality overrides any interest that a religious institution may
have in exercising beliefs which discriminate on the basis of race.
CONCLUSION
By denying tax-exempt status to schools which practice racially
discriminatory admission policies, the IRS hopes to further a national goal of
nondiscrimination in all areas. Since education occupies an especially protected
position in our society, it is axiomatic that where education is involved, racial
discrimination must not exist.
Although the courts should discourage nonlegislative bodies from
legislating, they cannot deny the IRS the right to interpret the tax laws. The
IRS successfully avoided the frustration of established federal policies by its
"U.S. Const. amend. I.
"Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
"Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
7 Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
7Bob Jones, 103 S.Ct. at 2035.
"3Id.
"Id. In order to avoid Free Exercise problems, the law must (1) have a secular legislative purpose, (2)
which neither enhances nor inhibits religions, and (3) avoids excessive entanglement with religion. Bob
Jones, 436 F.Supp. at 1320, (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) and Gillette v. U.S., 401
U.S. 437 (1971), rehearing denied sub nom. Negre v. Larsen, 402 U.S. 934 (1971)).
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interpretation of sections 501(c)(3) and 170. The Bob Jones Court, by suppor-
ting the IRS, strengthened this nation's commitment to nondiscrimination.
The denial of tax exemptions is not an unduly harsh penalty, and it ap-
pears unlikely that schools such as Bob Jones and Goldsboro will be forced
to close their doors. Nevertheless, Bob Jones will prove to be an important
triumph for racial equality. Religious organizations can no longer cloak their
prejudices in the first amendment and expect to receive tax exemptions from
the government. The effects of Bob Jones will have broad implications in other
contexts where institutions claim that their religious freedom allows them to
engage in racial discrimination.
MARGARET K. CASSIDY
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